TIME: Almanac 1993/TIME Almanac 1993.iso/time/021191/0211993.000

Text File | 1992-08-28 | 5.8 KB | 123 lines

                                                                                THE GULF WAR, Page 33

IRAN

The Not So Innocent Bystander


By agreeing to park Iraq's planes, Tehran is positioning itself
to play a stronger role in postwar gulf politics

By MICHAEL S. SERRILL -- Reported by Dean Fischer/Riyadh and
Farah Nayeri/Paris


    When a high-level delegation from Iraq began meetings with
Iranian officials in Tehran Jan. 8, the sessions attracted
little notice. After all, at that same moment U.S. Secretary
of State James Baker and Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz were
preparing to hold their last-minute talks in Geneva, and the
clock was ticking toward war. But political analysts in
Washington and the Middle East now believe a deal might have
been struck at those meetings in the Iranian capital, a deal
that last week triggered one of the more mysterious events of
the gulf war: the sudden departure for Iran of the cream of the
Iraqi air force.

    The migration, which was suspected to total 100 planes, left
allied officials perplexed. "It's tough for me to put any kind
of interpretation on what's going on," said chief of allied
operations General H. Norman Schwarzkopf. If Saddam Hussein was
behind the exodus -- and that was not absolutely certain -- his
goal was obvious: to save his air force from being destroyed
on Iraqi soil by allied bombers. But what had motivated Iran
to give a helping hand to its erstwhile enemy?

    No clear explanation came from Tehran. Iranian President Ali
Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani did assure the U.S.-led coalition,
however, that the decision to provide sanctuary to some of
Saddam's most sophisticated French and Soviet fighters and most
of his SU-24 Fencer bombers would not affect Iran's neutral
status. The planes, Iranian officials said, will be impounded
and held until hostilities end. They also insisted that no deal
had been cut with Baghdad in advance.

    Whether that is true or not, the decision to hold on to
Saddam's planes allows Tehran to play each side against the
other in the gulf conflict, to its own advantage. By
facilitating the removal of some 10% of Iraq's planes from
combat, Iran earns the gratitude of the U.S. and its allies.
"These aircraft are capable of reaching Israel, and their
absconding from Iraq greatly reduces Iraq's war potential,"
said Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Arens last week.

    As for Saddam Hussein, Iran is giving him hope that should
he outlast the U.N. coalition, he can still retain some of his
military muscle. By helping out Saddam, Rafsanjani is assuaging
the feelings of radical Islamic factions within Iran's
parliament, who are unhappy to see Iran ignore the pummeling
of fellow Muslims by Western forces.

    In its public pronouncements, Iran has expressed only
contempt for the goals of the U.S.-led coalition. Yet few
diplomats, including top U.S. specialists, doubt that Tehran
is determined to remain a bystander in the conflict. "I would
be flabbergasted if Iran made a 180 degrees turn, violated the
U.N. resolutions and sacrificed its neutrality," says a
European envoy in Riyadh. Says a senior British diplomat in
London: "Iran has nothing to gain by getting involved in the
war against the allies. Among other things, its military is in
terrible shape as a result of the Iran-Iraq war."

    Anti-American rhetoric by Islamic extremists in Tehran is
not to be taken seriously. "It is for domestic,
anti-imperialist consumption that the so-called radicals shout
warmongering slogans against the Americans," says an Iranian
political scientist living in Paris. "Even the Iranian
Revolutionary Guards are in no mood to join the hostilities."

    Iran has already gained a great deal by staying out of the
conflict. Not long after Iraq invaded Kuwait on Aug. 2, Saddam,
in a clear effort to keep Tehran neutral, announced that he
would release Iranian prisoners of war and give up Iranian
territory still held from the Iran-Iraq war. The gulf conflict
also has given Rafsanjani an opening to repair relations with
Saudi Arabia and the other gulf states, which supported Iraq
in its war with Iran. According to a senior Saudi official,
Tehran, as a reward for its neutrality, is asking for loans and
a lifting of the quota limiting Iranian participation in the
annual Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca.

    The most important advantage Iran hopes to gain is the
opportunity to emerge as an influence broker in the postwar
gulf. Until now, Tehran has been on the sidelines, frustrated
at the prospect of being excluded from the horse trading that
will take place after the war. Rafsanjani's immediate goal is
to head off any possible moves by coalition members,
particularly Turkey and Syria, to carve up Iraq after it is
defeated. Iran fears that Turkey may claim Iraqi Kurdistan and
its oil-rich areas of Mosul and Kirkuk, once part of the Ottoman
empire, and that Syria may attempt its own land grab. Iran is
eager to prevent -- by threats of force, if necessary -- any
postwar breakup of Iraq that would upset the delicate balance
of power in the region.

    While trying to keep its neighbors in check, Iran has been
quietly striving to win friends inside Iraq. Frequently accused
of violating the trade embargo against Baghdad in the run-up
to the war, Iran last week announced openly that it would be
sending food and medicine to Iraqi noncombatants, as is
permitted under U.N. guidelines. Both countries have Shi`ite
Muslim majorities, though the Baathist government of Saddam
Hussein is dominated by Sunni Muslims. Tehran's ultimate goal,
some analysts say, is to foment a takeover by Baghdad's
Shi`ites. If the day ever comes that friendly Shi`ites do
control Iraq, Iran might offer the new government a generous
gift: say, 100 or so fighters and bombers confiscated during
the gulf war.